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I. Introduction 
A great deal of opprobrium has been levied at President Donald 
Trump’s decision to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal.1  Many 
 
* Jamil N. Jaffer is a Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution and an 
Assistant Professor of Law at the Antonin Scalia Law School at George 
Mason University.  Professor Jaffer is also the Founder and Executive 
Director of the National Security Institute and Director of the National 
Security Law and Policy Program at the Scalia Law School and is 
affiliated with Stanford University’s Center for International Security 
and Cooperation. Professor Jaffer previously served as the Chief Counsel 
and Senior Advisor to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee where he 
was the chief architect of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act and 
also served in a variety of other national security roles in the legislative 
and executive branches, including as an Associate Counsel to President 
George W. Bush.  Professor Jaffer is an honors graduate of the 
University of Chicago Law School, the United States Naval War 
College, and the University of California at Los Angeles. He clerked for 
Judge Edith H. Jones of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit and Justice Neil M. Gorsuch of the United States Supreme 
Court. This paper was developed as part of the Case Western Reserve 
University Frederick K. Cox International Law Center’s Conference on 
International Law & Policy in the Age of Trump, held on September 14, 
2018 in Cleveland, Ohio.  The author would like to thank Chanel 
Urrutia for her very helpful research assistance. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019) 
Elements of Its Own Demise 
78 
supporters of the deal have argued that the decision to leave the deal 
undermines America’s credibility abroad, marking it as an itinerant 
partner, and may even violate international law.2  Contrary to this 
popular view of the deal and its legal status, this paper argues that 
early decisions made by the Obama Administration contributed to the 
deal’s failure and led to the United States’ eventual withdrawal.  For 
one, the Obama Administration chose not to submit the agreement—
known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—to 
Congress for ratification as a treaty nor did the Administration seek 
to negotiate an ex post approval regime ahead of time.3  Second, the 
Obama Administration decided to enter into the agreement solely as a 
“political commitment” between two sovereigns without even so much 
as complying with the typical formalisms—like a signed document—
that are typically associated with sole executive agreements.4  These 
decisions, combined with Congress’s forced review of the agreement 
and bipartisan majority votes against the deal—while ultimately not 
binding at law—sapped the deal of its legitimacy and eased the path 
for President Trump’s withdrawal.  That is, if one is looking to 
understand why the deal is no longer in place, one need look no 
further than the way the deal was reached, the prior Administration’s 
decision to ignore the clear domestic political opposition to the 
agreement, and its concomitant effort to freeze Congress out of the 
process.  It was these decisions that planted the key seeds for the 
deal’s ultimate demise. 
 
1. See Max Matza & Ritu Prasad, US Withdrawal Reverberates Across 
World, BBC NEWS (May 8, 2018, 5:35 PM), https://www.bbc.com 
/news/live/world-us-canada-44032008 [https://perma.cc/Z8YQ-AWYL]. 
(listing statements and reactions from individuals and organizations 
across the world from President Trump’s actions). 
2. Richard Nephew & Ilan Goldenberg, Here’s What to Expect Now That 
Trump Has Withdrawn From the Iran Nuclear Deal, the United States 
Will Be Worst Off Once the Smoke Clears, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 9, 
2018, 4:25 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/09/heres-what-to-
expect-now-that-trump-has-withdrawn-from-the-iran-nuclear-deal/. 
[https://perma.cc/6NYY-B888]. 
3. Bret Stephens, Opinion, A Courageous Trump Call on a Lousy Iran 
Deal, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018 
/05/08/opinion/trump-courageous-iran-decision.html 
[https://perma.cc/C4TE-CJTG]. 
4. Jack Goldsmith, The Trump Administration Reaps What the Obama 
Administration Sowed in the Iran Deal, LAWFARE (May 9, 2018, 9:29 
AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/trump-Administration-reaps-what-
obama-Administration-sowed-iran-deal [https://perma.cc/9VPA-TJVK]. 
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II. Background 
At the outset, it is worth reviewing a bit of the history behind the 
Iran nuclear agreement.  Bilateral negotiations underlying the deal 
between the United States and Iran began in secret in Oman in 2012.5  
This followed the imposition of strict Congressional sanctions, 
including the Central Bank of Iran secondary sanctions, which put a 
significant amount of stress on the Iranian economy by forcing major 
reductions in international oil purchases by putting purchasers under 
threat of being cut off from the U.S. banking system.6  The key 
negotiations began to take further shape as they came into public 
view in 2013, with the reentry of the P5+1 negotiating group—
composed of the permanent five members of the United Nations 
Security Council (United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, 
and China) plus Germany—into the U.S.-led negotiations.7  The 
negotiations nominally took place under the aegis of the P5+1 
through 2015; in reality, however, the principal negotiations were 
being conducted directly between the United States and Iran.8  The 
framework elements of the deal were initially announced on November 
24, 2014, as part of the initial Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), which 
was ultimately finalized and formalized in the JPCOA, announced on 
July 14, 2015.9   
As the public negotiations progressed, it eventually became clear 
to all involved, including Congress and the American public (and the 
Iranian leadership), that the President and his team did not intend on 
submitting the deal to Congress for its review or approval, whether as 
treaty subject to Senate advice and consent, or otherwise.10  In  
5. David Ignatius, The Omani ‘Back Channel’ to Iran and the Secrecy 
Surrounding the Nuclear Deal, WASH. POST (June 7, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-omani-back-channel-to-
iran-and-the-secrecy-surrounding-the-nuclear-deal/2016/06/07/0b9e27d4 
-2ce1-11e6-b5db-e9bc84a2c8e4_story.html?utm_term=.3d3817b030e1 
[https://perma.cc/4PQV-VZWG]. 
6. Protecting America from a Bad Deal: Ending U.S. Participation in the 
Nuclear Agreement Hearing Before the Subcomm. On National Security 
of Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 115th Cong. 115-84 
(2018) (statement of Richard Goldberg, Senior Advisor, Foundation for 
Defense of Democracies). 
7. Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, 
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-
With-Iran [https://perma.cc/HF3H-JHS6]. 
8. Id. 
9. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, July 14, 2015, available at 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5KS8-ASHL] [hereinafter JCPOA]. 
10. Matthew Weybrecht, State Department Affirms That Iran Deal is Only 
a Political Commitment, LAWFARE (Nov. 28, 2015, 2:10 PM), 
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addition, over time, it also became clear that the President did not 
intend to seek additional authority from Congress to remove the 
statutory and other sanctions imposed on Iran, but rather that he 
intended to use his existing statutory waiver authority to implement 
any sanction relief necessary under the agreement.11  At times, the 
President and his team indicated that Congress would have an 
opportunity to weigh in on the deal,12 however, as the deal was being 
finalized, it became apparent this opportunity would come only at the 
end of the deal itself, when, if Iran had fully complied, Congress 
would take action to permanently remove its statutory sanctions on 
Iran.13   
Notwithstanding the President’s determination to cede little, if 
any, ground to Congress on the negotiations with Iran, Congress 
nevertheless sought to influence the deal in a variety of ways.  Senior 
members of Congress introduced legislation that sought to provide 
guidance to the executive branch on the aspects of an eventual 
agreement that would be important to obtaining Congressional 
support for a deal.14  These same members of Congress also held 
hearings and sought briefings to obtain information about the course 
of the negotiations and to communicate their preferences directly to 
the Administration.15 
 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/state-department-affirms-iran-deal-only-
political-commitment. [https://perma.cc/QAL2-ZC9B]; see also 
Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran, supra note 7. 
11. Elena Chachko, Trump Withdraws from the Iran Nuclear Agreement: 
What Comes Next, LAWFARE (May 8, 2018, 7:30 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/trump-withdraws-iran-nuclear-agreement-
what-comes-next. [https://perma.cc/R9L8-UASG] 
12. Weybrecht, supra note 10. 
13. Natasha Turak, Iran Deal Won’t Survive Beyond May 2018, Sanctions 
Expert Says, CNBC (Jan. 19, 2018, 8:15 AM), https://www.cnbc.com 
/2018/01/19/iran-deal-wont-survive-beyond-may-2018-sanctions-expert-
says.html. [https://perma.cc/W47B-9WJA]. 
14. Jonathan Weisman & Peter Baker, Obama Yields, Allowing Congress 
Say on Iran Nuclear Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/15/us/senators-reach-deal-on-iran-
nuclear-talks.html. [https://perma.cc/ZF2D-SBFS]. 
15. See, e.g., Iran Nuclear Negotiations Act of 2014, S. 2650, 113th Cong. 
(2014) (expanding sanctions imposed with respect to Iran and to impose 
additional sanctions with respect to Iran, and for other purposes); 
Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act of 2013, S. 1881, 113th Cong. (2013) 
(expanding sanctions imposed with respect to Iran and to impose 
additional sanctions with respect to Iran, and for other purposes); Iran 
Nuclear Compliance Act of 2013, S. 1765, 113th Cong. (2013) (ensuring 
the compliance of Iran with agreements relating to Iran’s nuclear 
program); and United States-Iran Nuclear Negotiations Act, H.R. 3292, 
113th Cong. (2013) (preventing the Government of Iran from gaining a 
nuclear weapons capability and to maximize the United States 
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Following the announcement of the initial JPOA, while the final 
agreement was being negotiated, it likewise became apparent to key 
members of Congress that, not only did the President not intend to 
submit the deal to Congress for its approval, but also that the 
Administration might not even provide Congress with a copy of the 
agreement at all, at least not prior to its implementation.16  As a 
result, while Congress could not reach a bipartisan agreement to stop 
the President from making a deal with Iran, to require the President 
to seek additional waivers from Congress, or to remove or condition 
the President’s waiver authority on its approval, a strong bipartisan 
consensus began building around the notion that Congress ought at 
least get to see the deal ahead of time and ought have an opportunity 
to act on the deal before it was implemented.17 
The result of these efforts was the Iran Nuclear Agreement 
Review Act of 2015 (INARA).18  INARA, which initially drew a 
strong veto threat from the White House,19 eventually garnered 
enough support amongst members of Congress that the 
Administration not only withdrew its veto threat on the brink of an 
initial vote in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but 
ultimately allowed members of its own party to support the 
legislation.20  The legislation temporarily withdrew the President’s 
waiver authority and required him to submit the JPCOA and related 
materials to Congress.21 Under INARA, the President was then 
required to wait for a period of time to allow Congress to consider 
and vote on resolutions of approval or disapproval on the deal before 
 
diplomatic influence to achieve, consistent with the national security 
interest of the United States and its allies and partners, a negotiated 
settlement with the Government of Iran regarding Iran’s nuclear 
weapons program). 
16. Karen DeYoung, Republican Investigation Finds That Obama 
Administration Misled Congress on Possible Iranian Access to U.S. 
Financial System: The State and Treasury Departments Were Willing to 
Bend the Rules for the 2016 Transaction, Though it Never Went 
Through, BLOOMBERG LAW (June 7, 2018, 6:40 PM), 
https://www.bloomberglaw. com/ms/document/P9Z5N13HBS3K&head 
lineOnly=false [https://perma.cc/7TQZ-NGN8]. 
17. See The Hill’s Whip List: Obama has 42 Senate votes for Iran Deal, 
THE HILL (July 14, 2015, 7:56 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/floor-
action/senate/247956-the-hills-whip-list-senators-take-sides-on-iran-deal. 
[https://perma.cc/P37B-8GT4] (outlining each U.S. representative’s 
opinions on the Iran Deal). 
18. H.R. 1191, 114th Cong. (2015). 
19. Weisman & Baker, supra note 14. 
20. Id. 
21. Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, 42 USC § 2160e(a)(1). 
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he could implement any waivers of existing statutory sanctions.22 The 
bill eventually passed the Senate nearly unanimously (98-1) and 
garnered a supermajority in the House of Representatives (400-25).23 
Following the passage of the INARA, Senator Tom Cotton (R-
AR), the one member of the Senate who voted against the INARA, 
authored a letter, joined by 46 other U.S. Senators, to the Iranian 
President, noting that any Iran deal not approved by Congress could 
be revoked by the next President “with the stroke of a pen,” and that 
“future Congresses could modify the terms of the agreement at any 
time.”24  This letter—widely panned by most foreign policy pundits 
and claimed by some to run afoul of a rarely utilized (and almost 
never enforced), century-old law25—nonetheless served to convey the 
deep concerns among many members of Congress about the process 
by which the agreement was reached.26 The letter also put Iran—and 
the rest of the world community, including the P5+1—on notice that 
a significant portion of the elected representatives of the American 
people (at least in the upper house of Congress) were adamantly 
opposed to the deal.27   
The President, having been forced to withdraw his veto threat, 
signed the legislation and eventually provided the agreement along 
with certain key documents to both Houses of Congress.28 He also sent 
 
22. Id. at §2160e(b). 
23. Patricia Zengerle, U.S. House Passes Iran Nuclear Review Legislation, 
REUTERS (May 14, 2015, 4:18 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
iran-nuclear-usa-idUSKBN0NZ29M20150514 [https://perma.cc/GG9R-
STC6]; Lester Munson & Jamil Jaffer, Setting the Record Straight on 
Congress’s Review of the Obama-Iran Nuclear Deal, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 
17, 2016, 5:37 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com /2016/11/iran-
nuclear-deal-congress-review-obama-deal-was-important-inara/ 
[https://perma.cc/CXS8-SFK2].   
24. Letter from Senate Republicans to the Leaders of Iran (Mar. 9, 2015), 
available at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/09/world/ 
middleeast/document-the-letter-senate-republicans-addressed-to-the-
leaders-of-iran.html [https://perma.cc/B82T-ZJ3Y].  
25. Jeremy Diamond, Did 47 Republican Senators Break the Law in Plain 
Sight, CNN (Mar. 11, 2015, 11:21 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2015 
/03/10/politics/tom-cotton-iran-letter-logan-act/index.html. [https:// 
perma.cc/M2KQ-K8U6]. 
26. Id. 
27. Peter Baker, G.O.P. Senator’s Letter to Iran About Nuclear Deal 
Angers White House, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2015/03/10/world/asia/white-house-faults-gop-senators-letter-to-
irans-leaders.html [https://perma.cc/QV2U-8VBC]. 
28. Kevin Liptak, Now That He Has A Deal with Iran, Obama Must Face 
Congress, CNN (July 14, 2015), https://www.cnn.com/2015/07/14/ 
politics/iran-nuclear-deal-congress-obama-block/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/HB6B-TP8E]. 
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cabinet members and other senior national security officials to the Hill 
to testify on the agreement and to provide both classified and 
unclassified briefings to members.29  In essence, having been forced to 
cut Congress into the process at some level, the Administration 
mounted a full-throated campaign, leveraging sympathetic outside 
organizations, to put pressure on members of Congress to support the 
deal—or at least not vote against it when the INARA-driven vote 
came up.30  Ultimately, resolutions on the deal were considered in 
both Houses, and while the House voted against the deal with a 
substantial 269-162 bipartisan majority, the Senate—while also 
garnering a bipartisan 58 vote majority opposed to the deal—was 
unable to overcome the 60 vote threshold needed to stop a legislative 
filibuster of the disapproval resolution.31  And neither chamber was 
able to muster the supermajorities that would have been necessary to 
survive the inevitable presidential veto of any disapproval 
measure.32 Thus, while INARA succeeded in forcing the President to 
submit the deal to Congress and to pause on providing immediate 
sanctions relief to Iran,33 since Congress was unable to muster the 
votes necessary to overcome a filibuster and an eventual veto, 
following the end of the statutory review period mandated by the 
legislation, President Obama’s waiver authority was restored and he 
utilized it to provide the sanctions relief sought by Iran as part of the 
deal.34  Even more interesting, while the deal was pending review in 
Congress, the Administration went to the U.N. Security Council and 
obtained an ostensibly binding—at least under international law—
 
29. Kristina Wong, Former Top Officials Urge Congress to Back Iran Deal, 
THE HILL (July 20, 2015, 11:26 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/defense 
/248483-former-top-us-officials-iran-deal-meets-key-objectives 
[https://perma.cc/L4M9-WSNB]. 
30. Id. 
31. See Cristina Marcos, House Rejects Obama’s Iran Deal, THE HILL (Sept. 
11, 2015, 12:34 PM), https://thehill.com /blogs/floor-action/house 
/253370-house-rejects-iran-deal [https://perma.cc/67FQ-GR35]; see also 
Jennifer Steinhauer, Democrats Hand Victory to Obama on Iran 
Nuclear Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2015/09/11/us/politics/iran-nuclear-deal-senate.html 
[https://perma.cc/44VY-3284]. 
32. Id. 
33. Stephen Dinan, Senate Forces Obama to Submit Iran Nuclear Deal for 
Congressional Approval, WASH. TIMES (May 7, 2015), https://www. 
washingtontimes.com/news/2015/may/7/senate-forces-obama-submit-
nukes-deal-approval/ [https://perma.cc/E4GR-65ZP]. 
34. Sabrina Siddiqui, Republican-Led Attempt to Block Iran Deal Fails in 
Senate, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 10, 2015, 4:13 PM), https://www. 
theguardian.com/us-news/2015/sep/10/iran-nuclear-deal-senate-day-of-
decision [https://perma.cc/9U2G-EX8U]. 
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Security Council Resolution requiring states to comply with certain 
provisions of the deal.35 
And that was where things stood on the eve of the November 
2016 Presidential election when, against nearly every poll (and 
perhaps against all odds), Donald Trump became the President of the 
United States.  Then-President-Elect Trump, who—like nearly every 
other Republican candidate during the primaries—had made 
opposition to the Iran nuclear deal a centerpiece of his foreign policy 
platform during the general election campaign,36 once again made 
clear that he remained steadfastly opposed to the deal and that he 
intended to do away with it upon entering office.37  And yet through 
the first year of his presidency, despite near-unanimous opposition to 
the deal amongst the Republican members of Congress,38 and multiple 
opportunities to cease providing sanctions relief to Iran,39 even 
President Trump kept the Iran deal alive.40  Much of the pressure to 
keep the deal alive came from outside the Administration, from third 
party groups who supported the deal and former Obama 
 
35. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Adopting 
Resolution 2231 (2015), Endorses Joint Comprehensive Agreement on 
Iran’s Nuclear Programme, U.N. Press Release SC/11974 (July 20, 
2015); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential 
Control Over International Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1203, 1242 (2018) 
(noting that while the Administration did seek a UN Resolution, the 
resolution did not mandate the end of U.S. sanctions). 
36. See, e.g., Yeganeh Torbati, Trump Election Puts Iran Nuclear Deal on 
Shaky Ground, REUTERS (Nov. 9, 2016, 7:16 AM), https://www.reuters 
.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-iran/trump-election-puts-iran-
nuclear-deal-on-shaky-ground-idUSKBN13427E [https://perma.cc/9R77-
GNDZ] (“A businessman-turned-politician who has never held public 
office, Trump called the nuclear pact a ‘disaster’ and ‘the worst deal 
ever negotiated’ during his campaign and said it could lead to a ‘nuclear 
holocaust.’  In a speech to the pro-Israel lobby group AIPAC in March, 
Trump declared that his ‘Number-One priority’ would be to ‘dismantle 
the disastrous deal with Iran.’”). 
37. Id. 
38. Kevin Liptak & Nicole Gaouette, Trump Withdraws from Iran Nuclear 
Deal, Isolating Him Further From World, CNN (May 9, 2018, 1:51 
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/08/politics/donald-trump-iran-
deal-announcement-decision/index.html. [https://perma.cc/66VJ-
LWUW]. 
39. Trump Administration to Reinstate All Iran Sanctions, BBC NEWS 
(Nov. 3, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-us-canada-46071747 
[https://perma.cc/D824-9FNH]. 
40. Brian Naylor & Ayesha Rascoe, Trump: U.S. ‘Will Withdraw’ From 
Iran Nuclear Deal, NPR (May 8, 2018, 2:32 PM), https://www. 
npr.org/2018/05/08/609383603/trump-u-s-will-withdraw-from-iran-
nuclear-deal [https://perma.cc/6JUD-JP72]. 
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Administration officials,41 as well as the United States’ international 
partners, primarily the other P5+1 nations, who argued that the Iran 
deal, while perhaps not perfect, had largely been complied with and 
had successfully kept Iran at least some distance from a viable nuclear 
breakout capability.42   
While these arguments enjoyed some amount of resonance 
amongst staff and some key leaders in the Trump Administration, the 
President himself remained significantly skeptical.43  Outside groups 
looking at the deal argued that there were key aspects of Iranian 
noncompliance that had gone ignored by the prior Administration, as 
well as that fatal flaws in the deal which prevented it from truly being 
an effective bulwark against an Iranian nuclear capability.44  For these 
groups, at least, the Iran deal actually made the situation worse as it: 
(i) pulled the rug out from under an extremely effective, maximum-
pressure sanctions policy; (ii) overturned decades-long U.S. non-
proliferation policies, including opposing domestic uranium 
enrichment capabilities; and (iii) permitted Iran to escape 
accountability for its past nuclear weapons-related activities45 
(including employing a testing regime for former suspected weapons 
sites that would have made a Russian Olympic athlete proud).  
Moreover, for the individuals and groups opposed to the deal, the 
late-breaking decision by the Obama Administration to permit Iran to 
continue to develop its ballistic missile capabilities (and therefore its 
 
41. Rick Gladstone, 76 Experts Urge Donald Trump to Keep Iran Deal, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 
11/15/world/middleeast/trump-iran-deal.html [https://perma.cc/H4YJ-
JGNY]. 
42. Steve Holland & David Ljunggren, U.S. Allies Press Trump to Keep 
Iran Nuclear Deal Alive, REUTERS (Apr. 23, 2018, 12:05 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear/u-s-allies-press-trump-
to-keep-iran-nuclear-deal-alive-idUSKBN1HU28R 
[https://perma.cc/599B-DZY7]. 
43. Peter Baker, Trump Recertifies Iran Nuclear Deal, but Only 
Reluctantly, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/07/17/us/politics/trump-iran-nuclear-deal-recertify.html 
[https://perma.cc/8T6W-VHES]. 
44. TZVI KAHN, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES, CERTIFYING 
IRAN’S COMPLIANCE WITH THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION 
1-2, 5-6 (2017). 
45. Michael R. Gordon & David E. Sanger, Deal Reached on Iran Nuclear 
Program; Limits on Fuel Would Lessen with Time, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/middleeast/iran-
nuclear-deal-is-reached-after-long-negotiations.html?module=inline 
[https://perma.cc/L95G-ZD5P]. 
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nuclear weapons delivery capability), reversing a long-standing U.N. 
policy on ballistic missile launch by Iran,46 was particularly galling.   
Nonetheless, at least for the bulk of the first year, the President’s 
advisors who favored the deal were able to stave off Presidential 
action by seeking to work with Congress and the P5+1 nations to 
modify the deal without the United States backing out and 
reinstituting sanctions.47  Not surprisingly, with little leverage on its 
international partners and Congress, and even less with Iran, this 
Administration effort was unsuccessful, and the issue came to a head 
in 2018.  At that point, the President, having given in to pressure 
from his advisors on multiple occasions, and having sought alternative 
efforts to improve the deal through work with Congress and the P5+1 
partners, ultimately decided to use the mechanism provided under 
INARA.48  He first declined to certify Iran’s compliance with the 
deal,49 then eventually stopped issuing the Obama-era waivers that 
kept the deal in place.50  Thus, as of early November 2018, two years 
after his election, President Trump reinstituted the full scope of 
American sanctions against Iran, including the crushing secondary 
CBI sanctions that had pushed Iran to the negotiating table six years 
earlier.51 
While it remains to be seen whether the reinstitution of strict 
sanctions on Iran will once again force the regime back to the table to 
negotiate the “better deal” that President Trump and his foreign 
policy team has indicated they seek, this episode can perhaps provide 
future Administrations some critical lessons about the permanence 
and political stability of international agreements they enter into. 
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III. Mistakes at Home:  How the Obama 
Administration’s Approach to Getting the Iran Deal 
Done Eased the Path to the Trump Withdrawal 
A. What Kind of a Commitment Was the Iran Deal? 
The first question often litigated by proponents and opponents of 
the Iran nuclear deal is exactly what type of agreement it was and 
whether it should have been something else (or at least have been 
treated as such).52  There are five primary types of binding 
agreements between nation-states under international law: treaties, ex 
ante congressional-executive agreements, ex post congressional-
executive agreements, executive agreements made pursuant to an 
existing treaty, and sole executive agreements.53  In addition, states 
often enter into certain agreements that are not classically binding—
either domestically or internationally: the so-called political 
commitment.54  While scholars have noted that such political 
commitments have a questionable constitutional pedigree, including 
lacking stable grounding in any founding era understandings,55 the 
historical record indicates that fairly soon after the birth of the 
nation, the U.S. government began entering into such informal 
 
52. Gordon & Sanger, supra note 45. 
53. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 35, at 1207-08. 
54. See, e.g., Duncan B. Hollis & Joshua J. Newcomer, ”Political” 
Commitments and the Constitution, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 507, 516 (2009) 
(defining political commitments as “a nonlegally binding agreement 
between two or more nation-states in which the parties intend to 
establish commitments of an exclusively political or moral nature”); see 
id. at 519-20 & n. 42 (quoting the State Department’s position—
expressed in a transmittal document accompanying the START Treaty 
in 19991—that “[a] ‘political’ undertaking is not governed by 
international law . . . . Until and unless a party extricates itself from its 
‘political undertaking,’ which it may do without legal penalty, it has 
given a promise to honor that commitment, and the other Party has 
every reason to be concerned about compliance with such undertakings. 
If a Party contravenes a political commitment, it will be subject to an 
appropriate political response.”); see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra 
note 35, at 1218 (“A political commitment is an agreement, usually 
written, between the President or one of the President’s subordinates 
and a foreign nation or foreign agency. Its defining characteristic is that 
it imposes no obligation under international law and a nation incurs no 
state responsibility for its violation. As a result, a successor President is 
not bound by a previous President’s political commitment under either 
domestic or international law and can thus legally disregard it at will.”); 
Michael D. Ramsey, Evading the Treaty Power?: The Constitutionality 
of Nonbinding Agreements, 11 FIU L. REV. 371, 374–76 (2016). 
55. Hollis & Newcomer, supra note 54, at 512-513. 
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agreements.56  According to Professors Curtis Bradley and Jack 
Goldsmith, since the founding era, “Presidents have asserted the 
authority to make a political commitment on practically any topic 
without authorization from Congress or the Senate, and without any 
obligation to even inform Congress about the commitment, as long as 
the commitment does not violate extant federal law.”57  While there 
may have been some debate within the Obama Administration on 
whether the deal ought be entered into as a sole executive agreement 
early on, after the deal was reached, the Administration made clear 
that it had entered into the agreement as an unsigned, non-binding 
“political commitment.”58   
As a result, much of the debate since then has turned on whether, 
in fact, the Administration (and Congress) should have handled the 
deal differently.  Some opponents of the deal suggest that Congress 
actually did the nation a disservice by not forcing the President to 
submit the deal as a treaty, and have argued—perhaps in contrast to 
the most common-sense understanding of INARA—that by passing 
legislation that required the deal to be submitted to Congress (and 
ultimately voting to oppose the deal by bipartisan margins in both 
Houses), Congress was actually complicit in making the deal lawful.59  
 
56. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 35, at 1207 (“There is no evidence 
that the Founders discussed the possibility that the U.S. government 
would make international agreements through any process other than 
the treaty process. Nonetheless, beginning in the 1790s, the U.S. 
government began to make some international agreements through 
mechanisms other than the one described in Article II, although for a 
long time Article II treaties were still the dominant mode of agreement 
making.”); id. at 1218 (“The constitutional basis for a political 
commitment is unclear, but it appears to be closely related to the 
President’s power to conduct diplomacy, since at bottom a political 
commitment is like diplomatic speech backed by a personal pledge of the 
executive official who made it.”). 
57. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 35, at 1207. 
58. See Letter from Julia Frifield, Assistant Sec’y for Leg. Affairs, U.S. 
Dep’t of State, to Mike Pompeo, U.S. Representative, U.S. Congress 
(Nov. 19, 2015), available at http://www.humanrightsvoices.org 
/assets/attachments/documents/11.24.2015.state.dept.letter.jcpoa.pdf 
(“The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is not a treaty or 
an executive agreement, and is not a signed document. The JCPOA 
reflects political commitments between Iran, the P5+1 (the United 
States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China), and the 
European Union. As you know, the United States has a long-standing 
practice of addressing sensitive problems in negotiations that culminate 
in political commitments.”). 
59. Andrew C. McCarthy, Distorting the Iran-Deal Bill, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 
19, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2016/11/obama-
iran-deal-corker-bill/[https://perma.cc/PJM6-YU94]; see also Andrew 
McCarthy, The Corker Bill Isn’t a Victory — It’s a Constitutional 
Perversion, NAT’L REV. (Apr. 18, 2015), https://www. 
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Interestingly—in perhaps a paradigmatic situation of tough cases 
making for strange bedfellows—supporters of the Iran deal have 
likewise argued that Congress’s action effectively added to the 
President’s legal authorities.60 
The reality, of course, is that Congress was completely 
uninterested in assisting the President with the Iran deal.  To the 
contrary, as became clear later in the process, bipartisan majorities 
(including key players in President Obama’s own party like Senators 
Chuck Schumer and Bob Menendez) were steadfastly opposed to the 
deal.61  Thus, the notion that, somehow,  those who were fervently 
opposed to the deal actually sought to expedite its path or strengthen 
the President’s hand, simply makes no sense.  Indeed, as Professors 
Samuel Estreicher and Steven Menashi point out, the text of INARA 
clearly suggests that Congress “thought it was being unfairly sidelined 
from Iran policy and desperately wanted to reclaim some role in the 
process.”62  Estreicher and Menashi also correctly point out that, 
rather than authorizing unilateral executive action, INARA actually 
sought to restore significant congressional participation in the 
executive process related to the deal.63  And, as Bradley and 
Goldsmith accurately recognize, contrary to shepherding the deal 
through, the INARA successfully forced the President to submit the 
deal and its underlying materials to Congress and “spark[ed] an 
extensive national debate on the deal that forced the Obama 
Administration to explain and justify the Iran deal like it had not 
before.”64  Perhaps even more importantly, INARA also put members 
of Congress on the record—whether for or against the deal.65 
 
nationalreview.com/2015/04/corker-bill-isnt-victory-its-constitutional-
perversion-andrew-c-mccarthy/ [https://perma.cc/77HR-Y62W]. 
60. See Harold Hongju Koh, Triptych’s End: A Better Framework to 
Evaluate 21st Century International Lawmaking, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM 
338, 354-55 (2017) (“The only new piece of legislation enacted in 
response to the JCPOA, the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act 
(‘Corker/Cardin’ bill), does not undermine the President’s legal 
authorities; if anything, it added to them.”). 
61. Burgess Everett, Menendez, Schumer May Not Matter Much On Iran, 
POLITICO (Aug. 18, 2015 6:09 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2015/08/iran-deal-robert-menendez-
chuck-schumer-121501 [http://perma.cc /KP4X-XEZW]. 
62. Samuel Estreicher & Steven Menashi, Taking Steel Seizure Seriously: 
The Iran Nuclear Agreement and the Separation of Powers, 86 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1199, 1243 (2017). 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 1296. 
65. Id.  
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With respect to the question whether the agreement was properly 
conceived as a non-binding political commitment, Estreicher and 
Menashi argue that there are good reasons not to take the prior 
Administration’s position at face value.66  For example, they note that 
the agreement “simultaneously describes its provisions as voluntary 
and obligatory” and seeks to bind future Administrations to treating 
the waiver of sanctions under the deal “as an ongoing obligation of 
the United States.”67  Professor Michael Ramsey likewise notes that 
while “[i]n many respects [the JPCOA] has the character of a 
nonbinding agreement” it also has key aspects that “suggest[] a 
binding commitment,” including that “[i]t is very specific with respect 
to the sanctions relief the United States undertakes to provide and 
very specific as to the timetable.”68  Professor Ramsey also notes that 
“it is uncertain whether the U.S. negotiators made clear to the other 
parties that the agreement was nonbinding” and that “[s]ome 
statements by Iranian officials indicate the contrary.”69 
Not surprisingly, supporters of the Iran deal take a different view.  
Harold Hongju Koh, the former legal advisor to the State Department 
in the Obama Administration, argues that the JCPOA is purely a 
“political…commitment in both form and substance” in that “[o]n 
matters of substance, the parties went out of their way to style the 
obligations as ‘voluntary’—things they ‘will do’ (not ‘shall do’)—and 
carefully avoided all the procedural trappings of a binding 
convention.”70 
Of course, the proof is in the agreement itself.  And when one 
turns to the agreement, it seems that Estreicher, Menashi, and 
Ramsey have the better of the argument.  While the agreement is 
nominally political, in that it is unsigned, it also makes clear that the 
breach of its terms relieves the other parties of their obligation to 
comply.71  Likewise, given that the agreement itself purports to 
commit the United States to a fifteen-year course of action wherein, if 
Iran complies, sanctions must regularly be waived every 90-to-180 
 
66. Estreicher & Menashi, supra note 62, at 1203-4. 
67. Id. at 1203. 
68. Michael D. Ramsey, Evading the Treaty Power?: The Constitutionality 
of Nonbinding Agreements, 11 FIU L. REV. 371, 378–9 (2016). 
69. Id. at 379. 
70. Koh, supra note 60, at 353. 
71. See Chris Bushell & Sam Waudby, An Unsigned Agreement Can Still 
Bind The Parties, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS (Apr. 10, 2015 9:51 AM), 
https://hsfnotes.com/litigation/2015/04/10/an-unsigned-agreement-can-
still-bind-the-parties/ [https://perma.cc/T57E-ZFZT] (discussing the 
implications of breaching an unsigned agreement); see also Letter from 
Julia Frifield, supra note 58. 
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days, over the course of at least five separate presidential terms.72  
Given these provisions, it is hard to understand how any future 
President might view the agreement as anything other than an 
attempt to bind him or her to its terms in the long-run. 
Even if we take the prior Administration’s position at face-value 
that they sought to put in place a political commitment in, it is worth 
assessing whether they succeeded in doing so.  Professor Ramsey has 
argued that for political commitments to be considered legitimate, 
they ought meet certain constitutional requirements, such that they 
don’t “erode the protections of the treaty-making clause”:   
First, nonbinding agreements…should have no domestic legal 
effect in U.S. courts nor impose any legal obligations on U.S. 
domestic entities…[] Second, the President...must [en]sure that a 
purportedly nonbinding agreement is clearly and unequivocally 
nonbinding under international law….[] Third, a nonbinding 
agreement [cannot] constrain future Presidents (even 
informally)…Thus, a nonbinding agreement cannot be 
understood as imposing constraints on policymakers within the 
U.S. domestic legal or political system and it cannot be 
represented to foreign parties as imposing any constraints on 
U.S. policymakers in the international legal or political system.73 
Professor Ramsey further argues that an additional limitation is 
worth considering:  ensuring that nonbinding agreements not make 
“specific commitment[s] on behalf of the United States which the 
current U.S. President cannot fulfill” because such future 
commitments “might create expectations and reliance by the other 
party, and thus implicate the policies of the treaty-making clause.”74   
In at least three respects, the JCPOA runs afoul of Professor 
Ramsey’s criteria.  First, the JCPOA clearly seeks to impose some 
measure of constraints on U.S. policymakers within our domestic 
political system, in that it required the issuance of waivers on a going-
forward basis during the then-current Administration.75  Second, the 
Obama Administration’s decision to go to the U.N. Security Council 
for a formal resolution, also sought to impose constraints on U.S. 
policymakers in both the international legal and political systems, in 
that it bound the United States, like all other member states, to 
comply with certain of the JCPOA’s provisions (albeit not the 
requirement to lift U.S. sanctions).76  Third, the JPCOA makes 
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73. Ramsey, supra note 68, at 375-6. 
74. Id. at 376-77. 
75. Id. at 379. 
76. See Press Release, supra note 35. 
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commitments that then-current President cannot fulfill, in that it 
purports to commit future Presidents—like the current President in 
this instance—to continue issuing the same waivers that the prior 
President used to effectuate the Iran deal.77   
Moreover, as Professors Bradley and Goldsmith point out, 
regardless whether such agreements are formally binding, “[i]n 
practice…the actions of an earlier President affect and narrow the 
options of a later President.”78  And indeed, that is exactly what 
happened here.  Even though President Trump came into office 
adamantly opposed to the Iran nuclear deal—the very “status quo 
bias and bureaucratic inertia” that Bradley and Goldsmith highlight, 
accompanied by concerns about upsetting the ongoing allied efforts to 
reintegrate Iran into the global economy—hampered the President 
from implementing his preferred policy of getting rid of the Iran deal 
for over the first year-and-a-half of his Administration.79 
B.  Why a Political Commitment? 
In assessing the impact of the prior Administration’s decision to 
use a political commitment-style vehicle for the JCPOA, it may be 
valuable to understand why it went down that road rather than 
entering into a treaty or another form of binding international 
agreement. At a minimum, it is clear, as Estreicher and Menashi note, 
that at least one key factor in the decision was the fact that the 
“President could not proceed...by treaty because majorities in both 
houses of Congress opposed the pact.”80 This fact, highlighted by the 
votes required by INARA, made clear that the Administration simply 
did not have the votes it would have needed to get a congressional-
executive agreement in place, much less the supermajority of votes 
needed to obtain the Senate’s advice and consent to a treaty.81  
Indeed, Secretary John Kerry—in a moment of candor before the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee—admitted as much, arguing that 
the Administration had treated the JPCOA as a political commitment 
specifically because they didn’t think they could get it through the 
Senate as a treaty.82  And while Secretary Kerry argued at that 
 
77. Ramsey, supra note 68, at 380. 
78. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 35, at 1253-54. 
79. Id. at 1254. 
80. Estreicher & Menashi, supra note 62, at 1202. 
81. Id.  
82. See Iran Nuclear Agreement: The Administration’s Case, Hearing 
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 114th Cong. 83 (2015) 
(testimony of Secretary Kerry responding to a question from Rep. 
Ribble: ”I spent quite a few years ago trying to get a lot of treaties 
through the United States Senate. Frankly, it’s become physically 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019) 
Elements of Its Own Demise 
93 
hearing that treaties had generally become “impossible” to get 
through the Senate,83 as the immediate past Chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, he had to be aware that between 2009 
and 2014, the Senate had given its advice and consent to 13 treaties 
submitted by the Obama Administration, including the controversial 
New START Treaty.84 
 
impossible…you can’t pass a treaty anymore…It’s become impossible to 
pass.”). 
83. Id. 
84. See id.; Convention on the Conservation and Management of High 
Seas Fishery Resources in the South Pacific Ocean, Nov. 14, 2009, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 113-1, available at https://www.congress.gov/treaty-
document/113th-congress/1/resolution-text?r=26&s=1 
[https://perma.cc/3ZWS-DEEJ]; Amendment to the Convention on 
Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, 
Sept. 28, 2007. S. Treaty Doc. No. 113-3, available at 
https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/113th-
congress/3/resolution-text?r=24&s=1 [https://perma.cc/FJY2-PQM8]; 
Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate 
Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing, Nov. 22, 2009, S. Treaty 
Doc. No. 112-4, available at   https://www.congress.gov/treaty-
document/112th-congress/4/resolution-text [https://perma.cc/MP48-
Y38H]; Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with Bermuda, Jan. 12, 2009, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 111-6, available at https://www.congress.gov/treaty-
document/111th-congress/6/resolution-text?r=37&s=1 
[https://perma.cc/ZF87-88WM]; Investment Treaty with Rwanda, Feb. 
19, 2008, S. Treaty Doc. No. 110-23, available at 
https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/110th-
congress/23/resolution-text [https://perma.cc/WQ3B-C4WQ]; Treaty 
with Russia on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms, Apr. 8, 2010, S. Treaty Doc. No. 111-5, 
available at https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/111th-
congress/5/resolution-text [https://perma.cc/K8XC-3324]; Treaty with 
United Kingdom Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation, June 21-26, 
2007, S. Treaty Doc. No. 110-7, available at 
https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/110th-
congress/7/resolution-text [https://perma.cc/38CR-RR9U]; Treaty with 
Australia Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation, Sept. 5, 2007, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 110-10, available at https://www.congress.gov/treaty-
document/110th-congress/10?r=56&s=1 [https://perma.cc/RLE6-
9T2V]; Hague Convention on International Recovery of Child Support 
and Family Maintenance, Nov. 23, 2007, S. Treaty Doc. No. 110-21, 
available at https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/110th-
congress/21/resolution-text?r=26 [https://perma.cc/B7AD-JDWH]; Tax 
Convention with Malta, Aug. 8, 2008, S. Treaty Doc. No. 111-1, 
available at https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/111th-
congress/1/resolution-text?r=21 [https://perma.cc/P4XN-XQ5G]; 
Protocol Amending Tax Convention with New Zealand, Dec. 1, 2008, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 111-3, available at https://www.congress.gov/treaty-
document/111th-congress/3/resolution-text [https://perma.cc/UV2K-
GJ22]; Treaty Doc. 111-4, Protocol Amending Tax Convention with 
France, Jan. 13, 2009, S. Treaty Doc. No. 111-4, available at 
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Moreover, the prior Administration’s approach to the JCPOA was 
not a mere flash in the pan, but rather was reflective of a larger trend 
of the Administration eschewing treaties in favor of more Executive-
friendly approaches.  For example, Professors Goldsmith and Bradley 
point out that while the overall trend of treaty submission has been 
on a downward slope in prior Administrations for structural reasons, 
the Obama Administration had historically low numbers in the 
average number of treaties transmitted per presidential year—4.75—
as compared to the modern post-Truman average of 15.3 per year.85  
This is not to suggest that Secretary Kerry was incorrect when he 
assessed that the Administration would face an uphill battle in the 
Senate if it were to have submitted the JPCOA as a treaty, after all, 
his vote count correctly previewed the majority bipartisan opposition 
demonstrated by the INARA deal votes.86  And, to be fair, Secretary 
Kerry was also right that as a general matter, the Obama 
Administration faced a tougher treaty approval regime than prior 
Administrations; as Goldsmith and Bradley point out, the prior 
Administration’s treaty approval rate was substantially lower—39% 
versus 92% historically—suggesting that politics also likely played a 
key role.87  
Given all this, one can perhaps understand why the 
Administration eschewed the treaty mechanism and sought to go 
down the political commitment road in the case of the JCPOA.  But 
the next question that must be considered is whether there is a 
historical basis for entering into an agreement like the JCPOA 
through the mechanism of an unsigned, non-binding political 
commitment.  And on that front, the Administration doesn’t fare 
quite well either.  At least one academic piece to examine the 
 
https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/111th-
congress/4/resolution-text?r=20 [https://perma.cc/LK5H-DT35]. 
85. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 35, at 1210-11. 
86. Munson & Jaffer, supra note 23. 
87. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 35, at 1211; see also David S. Jonas & 
Dyllan M. Taxman, JCP-No-Way: A Critique of the Iran Nuclear Deal 
as A Non-Legally-Binding Political Commitment, 9 J. NAT’L SECURITY 
L. & POL’Y 589, 595-96 (2018) (noting that “the Senate has actually 
been a friend to the President in international agreement-making: it has 
rarely denied advice and consent…and its partisan identity has not been 
indicative of its ability to pass important arms control and 
nonproliferation agreements”). Indeed, according to Jonas and Taxman, 
the Senate has repeatedly expressed its preference for treaties in the 
arms control area by consistently granting its advice and consent—at a 
“near-perfect rate”—to such agreements. Id. at 602-03. According to 
them, the Senate’s overall rejection rate for treaties is below two 
percent, and even accounting for treaties that are left to lie fallow, 
between 1949-2000, under eight percent of treaties failed to receive the 
Senate’s advice and consent. Id. at 603. 
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question closely has made the strong argument that the JPCOA is 
“the only highly significant nonproliferation agreement to be 
negotiated as an unsigned non-binding political commitment in 
modern American history.”88   
In examining the historical pedigree of arms control agreements, 
Professor David Jonas and Dyllan Taxman compiled what they argue 
is a comprehensive list of the most significant international arms 
control and nuclear nonproliferation agreements involving the United 
States.89  According to Jonas and Taxman, 79% of these agreements 
have been classic Article II treaties, 95% have been binding at 
international law, and all of these agreements, save the JCPOA, were 
signed.90  Moreover, Jonas and Taxman note that the significant 
majority of multilateral agreements of all varieties—of which the 
JCPOA is one—are entered into as Article II treaties (between 60-
75%).91  Indeed, according to their analysis, only one multilateral 
arms-control agreement other than the JCPOA has ever been entered 
into outside the treaty process.92  This all, of course, bears significant 
note because, if Jonas and Taxman have it right, the JCPOA is a 
significant deviation from the norm of nonproliferation and arms 
control agreements across a variety of factors—even when it comes to 
non-binding political commitments which are, themselves, quite rare 
in this arena.93 
Jonas and Taxman also note that some of the obvious reasons 
that Presidents use treaties as the primary vehicles for major 
international arms control agreements is that successful completion of 
 
88. Jonas & Taxman, supra note 87, at 590. 
89. Id. at 596 (“The authors have compiled, in an Appendix to this article, 
a comprehensive list of the most significant arms control and nuclear 
nonproliferation agreements to which the United States has been party 
or participant.”). 
90. Id. (“The Appendix spans nearly 100 years of U.S. treaty history and 
includes 58 national security agreements, 57 of which deal directly and 
specifically with arms control or nuclear nonproliferation. Of the 57 
most significant nuclear- or arms control-specific agreements into which 
the United States has entered, 45 have been Article II treaties (79%)-- 
these agreements are listed in the first segment of the Appendix; 54 
have been legally binding international law treaties (95%)--
these agreements comprise the first and second sections of the 
Appendix; of the 58 agreements, all but the Iran Nuclear Deal are 
signed.”). 
91. Id. at 598. 
92. Id. 
93. See id. at 595 (“Non-binding political commitments in arms control and 
nonproliferation are scarce, and significant landscape-altering political 
commitments in the nonproliferation and arms control arenas are almost 
non-existent outside of the Iran Nuclear Deal.”). 
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the treaty process demonstrates deep public (and elite) support and 
provides foreign governments—who understand the significant 
expenditure of political capital required to obtain Senate consent—
with assurance that the deal will likely have relative permanence.94  
Indeed, the authors argue that the value of treaties is even more 
significant in cases—like here—where there is limited trust between 
the parties.95  For example, the Soviet Union repeatedly pressed the 
United States to submit arms control agreements as treaties, 
including SALT II in the Carter Administration (which was never 
ratified due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which caused Carter 
to pull the treaty from the Senate) and SORT in the Bush 43 
Administration (which was ratified 95-0 in the US Senate and was in 
effect from 2003-2011).96 
Contrary to this historical trend with respect to arms control 
agreements, however, the prior Administration chose to implement 
the Iran nuclear agreement as a political commitment.  In doing so, 
Bradley and Goldsmith argue that the Administration essentially 
“established a new form of unilateral international lawmaking,” by 
creating an international agreement that relied inherently upon 
existing statutory authority delegated to the executive branch.97  
That the Administration was able to do so and essentially ignore the 
fact that bipartisan majorities in both houses opposed the agreement 
was, in the view of these scholars, a “significant constitutional 
innovation” that “vastly expand[ed] the President’s power to make 
and implement international agreements (albeit nonbinding ones).”98 
C.  And What About the Sanctions? 
One final question that may be worth considering is why the prior 
Administration sought to unilaterally use its existing statutory waiver 
authority, rather than going back to Congress for clear authority to 
implement the deal.  Interestingly, Europe chose a different path.  As 
 
94. Id. at 597-98 (“Scholars have noted that foreign leaders prefer Article II 
treaties and are aware of the political capital required of a U.S. 
President to acquire a two-thirds Senate majority making it highly 
unlikely that the United States will renege on an agreement….The 
widespread support for an agreement demonstrated by the Article II 
process has a spiraling effect on its perceived longevity: the President’s 
predecessors are less likely to back out when support is high; legislators 
are less likely to pass laws inconsistent with the treaty, putting the U.S. 
in breach; and foreign heads of state are less likely to resist execution or 
withdraw knowing that the President, the legislature, their predecessors, 
and the American people stand behind the agreement.”); id. at 602. 
95. Id. at 602. 
96. Id. 
97. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 35, at 1219. 
98. Id. at 1219-20. 
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Estreicher and Menashi point out, under the terms of the deal itself, 
while the United States committed itself to “act[ing] ‘pursuant to 
Presidential authorities’ to ‘ceas[e] the application of the statutory 
nuclear-related sanctions,’” the “European Union also agreed to lift 
the sanctions it had imposed, but it adopted implementing legislation 
in order to do so.”99   
At the outset, it’s worth noting that unlike in the political sphere, 
the Obama Administration “never claimed that [its] decision to 
impose or to lift sanctions on a foreign state [was] an area of exclusive 
presidential authority.”100  Rather, President Obama took the position 
that “he could lift the sanctions based on congressionally delegated 
authority in the existing sanctions legislation.”101  The problem with 
this approach, as Professors Estreicher and Menashi point out, is that 
it “contradicts the expressed intent of Congress in the sanctions 
statutes.”102  According to Estreicher and Menashi, the waiver 
provisions in those statutes were specifically focused on individual 
cases, rather than the “across-the-board,” long-term waivers of the 
type contemplated in the deal.103  Indeed, they argue that contrary to 
“act[ing] within the legislative framework established by 
Congress….[President Obama] essentially overturned that 
framework.”104  Even more troubling, Estreicher and Menashi note 
that there is little if any historical precedent—save in the narrow area 
of claims settlement—for the notion that the President can enter into 
non-treaty agreements that have such legislative effects.105 
 
99. Estreicher & Menashi, supra note 62, at 1201 nn.2 & 3 (citing JCPOA, 
supra note 9, annex V, at 1-2; EUR. UNION EXTERNAL ACTION, 
INFORMATION NOTE ON EU SANCTIONS TO BE LIFTED UNDER THE JOINT 
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION (JCPOA) 13 (2016), 
http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/iran_implementat
ion/information_note_eu _ sanctions _jcpoa_en.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/28HM-LRA6]). 
100. Estreicher & Menashi, supra note 62, at 1201-02. Of course, as 
Estreicher and Menashi note, the Administration probably didn’t make 
such a claim because it “would be highly doubtful.” Id. 
101. Id. at 1203. 
102. Id. at 1204. 
103. Id.; see also id. at 1230-41 (examining each of the applicable Iran 
sanctions regimes and concluding that the waivers contained therein 
were focused on individual exceptions). 
104. Id. at 1204. 
105. See id. at 1215 (“There is no basis for arguing that a history of 
congressional acquiescence has added a ‘historical gloss’ to the 
foundational constitutional principle that the executive is not a 
lawmaker even when dealing with foreign relations….[Indeed, the] 
understanding of the limited, nonlegislative effect of sole executive 
agreements has not been disturbed in subsequent practice, with one 
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Again, perhaps unsurprisingly, supporters of the JCPOA argue 
that the legislative sanctions framework explicitly provided the 
President all the authority he needed to carry out the terms of his 
political commitment in the Iran Deal.106  For example, Professor Koh 
argues that not only is there “ample domestic legal authority for…the 
President to suspend economic sanctions pursuant to waiver authority 
provided by Congress,” but that “this [authority] is not just ‘general 
preauthorization,’ of the type that one might find in certain types of 
congressional-executive agreements, “but specific statutory 
authorization of the Youngstown Category One land.”107  Moreover, 
Professor Koh argues that while the Constitution provides Congress 
clear authority over foreign commerce, including sanctions, Congress 
has “undeniably” delegated the implementation of this authority to 
the President and given him specific statutory authority to waive 
sanctions in the national interest.108 
On this point the record is perhaps more mixed.  To be sure, the 
textual waiver authority provided to the President does not admit 
any specific temporal or substantive limitations save, in some cases, 
certain findings with respect to national security and the requirement 
to renew the waivers on a regular basis.109  So, while Estreicher and 
Menashi are right that the structure of the sanctions laws make clear 
that Congress intended the typical waivers to be narrow and short-
term, nothing on the face of the law itself prevents the President from 
making the type of findings both President Obama and Trump (at 
least for the first year) made, and nor does anything prevent any 
President from implementing such waivers over and over again for 
years  to come.  On the other hand, what is also clear is that a key 
reason for the Administration’s decision to go down the road of using 
its existing statutory authority, just like its decision to go down the 
political commitment road, was its inability to muster the votes in 
Congress to get new authority from Congress to reduce sanctions as 
part of the Iran nuclear deal.110  
 
possible exception: the President’s practice of utilizing executive 
agreements to settle claims of Americans against foreign governments.”). 
106. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 60, at 353 (asserting that the President has 
such authority under domestic law). 
107. Id. (emphasis in original). 
108. Id. at 353-54. 
109. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 8804(g) (2018). 
110. See Estreicher & Menashi, supra note 62, at 1202 (indicating that 
President Obama could not enact the Iran Nuclear Deal by statute or 
treaty because of lack of support from Congress). 
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IV. Lessons Learned 
So, what might all of this teach a future Administration about 
international accords and their stability?  One obvious lesson—that 
our allies and counterparties have already learned—is that if one is 
looking for permanence in an international accord with the United 
States, one ought encourage the United States to look for a vehicle 
that has at least some measure of interbranch cooperation and, to the 
extent you can get it, you want to get a treaty.  That much, perhaps, 
was obvious from the outset, but the question then becomes what 
happens when the executive is faced with a recalcitrant legislature 
that prefers additional pressure to a potential deal, as the Obama 
Administration was.   
The answer is perhaps counterintuitive.  The typical reaction of 
executive branch officials—as it was in the prior Administration—is 
to try to get out from under the thumb of Congress, whether by hook 
or by crook.  As it turns out, that approach, while perhaps easier in 
the short-run, can have the long-term effect of actually sapping the 
core authority and legitimacy of a deal.  Instead, a wiser path might 
have been to include key members of Congress—particularly Senators, 
including those of the opposite party from the President—on the 
negotiating team.  Under such a scenario, if a deal is reached, it 
would put a bipartisan group of members on the hook to advocate for 
an agreement.  That is, taking such an approach would give a future 
Administration a group of key players on Capitol Hill with built-in 
buy-in for the Administration’s position.   
A more limited version of this approach might be to use the 
method employed by the Iranians in their negotiations with the 
United States:  that is, using the legislature as the “bad cop” in the 
negotiation.  Indeed, repeatedly throughout the negotiation process, 
when the deal terms got tough, the Iranians would go to U.S. 
negotiators with the old saw that they were under pressure back 
home, whether from the Supreme Leader or from the Iranian Majlis.111  
The Iranians would repeatedly exploit this claim—even in the late 
hours of the final deal—to extract further concessions from the 
P5+1.112  In stark contrast, the prior Administration regularly stiff- 
111. See generally Ariane Tabatabai, Reading the Nuclear Politics in Tehran, 
ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.armscontrol 
.org/ACT/2015_09/Feature/Reading-the-Nuclear-Politics-in-
Tehran#note12 [https://perma.cc/4UZ3-GZZX] (“The distinction 
between rhetoric and policy is crucial in understanding Iranian 
intentions and actions.”). 
112. See generally Gareth Porter, Behind the Scenes: How the US and Iran 
Reached Their Landmark Deal, THE NATION (Sept. 5, 2015), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/behind-the-scenes-how-the-us-and-
iran-reached-their-landmark-deal/ [https://perma.cc/XN4Y-GSQN] 
(outlining the timeline of the Iran Nuclear Deal provisions). 
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armed Congress, telling the Iranians that the President had all the 
authority needed to do the deal on his own and that Congress would 
be kept tightly in its lane.113  This approach, of course, turned 
Congress against the President and his deal and, at the same time, 
gave away a potential bargaining chip the President might otherwise 
have used to improve the deal vis-à-vis the Iranians.   
One might argue, however, that a President brings Congress into 
a negotiation early at his or her own risk.  Namely, one might 
reasonably argue that bringing in Congress will simply make a deal 
harder to get because members of Congress are likely dig in on 
negotiations, sometimes even seeking to undermine the entire effort.  
However, as Estreicher and Menashi point out, when responding to 
executive action in the foreign affairs arena that exceeds classic 
boundaries of the separation of powers, Congress is handicapped by 
practical difficulties that make it difficult for Congress to oppose such 
action, including the need to obtain supermajorities to overcome a 
potential Presidential veto.114  This is particularly true where, as here, 
prior Congressional action appears to provide sufficient authority for 
the President to act.115  Thus, at least in the circumstance facing the 
prior Administration, there’s good reason to believe that members of 
Congress, knowing it would have been difficult getting engaged 
substantively on the Iran issue without the President bringing them 
in, might actually appreciate the effort and be good actors—including 
as potential “bad cops”—if brought into the process. 
Finally, one key element for executive branch negotiators to 
consider:  if a major international deal cannot get even a bare 
majority of political support in either House of Congress, it simply 
may not be the right deal to do.  Here, the Iran deal was seen—
correctly—as having so many deep-seated flaws, it would have been 
hard to catalogue them all.116  Nonetheless, the prior Administration 
 
113. See generally id. 
114. See Estreicher & Menashi, supra note 62, at 1249 (“Recent scholarship 
on ‘historical gloss’ and congressional acquiescence to executive action 
testing the boundaries of separated powers rightly emphasizes the 
practical difficulties Congress faces when trying to act as a unitary body 
to resist perceived executive overreach.  These logistical barriers are 
part of the constitutional design.  The President has the advantage of 
initiative, both in the foreign relations and domestic spheres.  It is 
difficult for Congress to pass laws, amend or repeal them, or take other 
action as a body to express opposition to executive action.  Even when a 
course of action enjoys majority support in both houses, that may still 
not be enough congressional consensus to override an express or 
impliedly threatened veto; this was the dynamic behind the Iranian 
Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015.”). 
115. Id. 
116. See, e.g., Blaise Misztal, Iran Deal Limits Inspectors’ Access to 
Suspicious Sites, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. (July 17, 2015), 
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barreled forward, ignoring the complaints, committed to the notion 
that all those legislators on Capitol Hill (and the American people 
they represented) were just wrong and that the deal, properly 
understood by the elite P5+1 negotiators, the Secretary of State, and 
the President, was, in fact, worth doing.  Of course, had the 
Administration forced itself to get congressional assent, whether 
through the treaty or another process, or had cut key members of 
Congress into the process, it likely would have been back at the 
negotiating table and might very well have gotten a better deal that 
would have been more politically sustainable in the long run. 
At the end of the day, the key takeaway from the Iran nuclear 
deal experience for all is pretty straightforward:  do not do a major 
deal that you cannot sell at home.  The framers understood this, 
having created a system of separated powers for just such deals.  
Executive branch officials would be wise to look back to those 
constructs going forward. 
 
 
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/delayed-inspections-jcpoa-provisions-
for-iaea-access-to-suspicious-sites/ [https://perma.cc/R3VA-4VK2] 
(describing key flaws in the Iran deal related to sites with prior military 
dimensions). 
